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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
MARCH, 1950

No. 5

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIRECTED
VERDICT

William Wirt Blume*

TI ECENT

decisions of the Supreme Court of the United

~ States have aroused a new interest in the familiar motion for a

directed verdict.1 In ·this discussion the writer will undertake
a brief examination of the antecedents of the motion, and then will
trace its short but significant history.
A. Bushell's Case

In 1908 a tablet was placed in the New Central Criminal Court,
Newgate Street, London, reading as follows:
Near this Site
WILLIAM PENN and WILLIAM MEAD
were tried in 1670
for preaching to an unlawful assembly
in Grace Church Street ·
This tablet commemorates
The courage and endurance of the Jury Thos Vere,
Edward Bushell and ten others who refused to give
a verdict against them, although locked up without
food for two nights, and were fined for their final
Verdict of not Guilty
The case of these Jurymen was reviewed on a Writ
of Habeas Corpus and Chief Justice Vaughn delivered the opinion of the Court which established
"The Right of Juries" to give their Verdict
according to their Convictions2
"' Professor of Law, University of l'vlichigan.-Ed.
See comment, 47 Mica:L. Rllv. 974 (1949). Also see "The Supreme Court, 1948
Term," 63 HARv. L. REv. 162 (1949).
2 Frontispiece of THB TRIAL oP WILLIAM PENN AND WILLIAM Mun:s AT THB OLD
BAILllY 1670 (''Reprinted from the original 4to, issued in the year 1670") (1908).
1
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A report of the trial of Penn and Mead published by the defendants
in 16703 shows that the judges of the court (a court of special sessions
made up of the mayor, recorder, and certain aldermen of London)
were especially abusive towards Edward Bushell because of the refusal
of the jury to bring in a verdict which would conform to the views of
the court. After the jurors were 6.ned for their verdict, Bushell, instead of paying the 6.ne imposed on him, applied to the Court of
Common Pleas for a writ of habeas corpus. 4 It was in this case that
Chief Justice Vaughn established "The Right of Juries" referred to in
the tablet.
In response to the writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court of
Common Pleas the sheriffs of London returned that Bushell had been
committed to the gaol of Newgate by virtue of an order of the Court
of Sessions which stated that the jurors in the case of Penn and Mead
had acquitted the defendants "contra plenam & manifestam evidentiam, & contra directionem Curiae in materia legis." The two grounds
for commitment were considered separately.
1. Acquittal against -full and manifest evidence. The Chief Justice
quickly disposed of this cause for 6.ne and imprisonment by pointing
out that it was not said that the jurors knew and believed that the
evidence was full and manifest, and therefore acted corruptly. He
observed that two persons may disagree on the conclusions to be drawn
from the same testimony in the same way that two students or barristers may disagree as to the law to be drawn from the same case. Further he noted that jurors differ from witnesses in that witnesses swear
to what they have seen and heard, while jurors swear to what they
can infer and conclude from the testimony of others; that the inferring
of a fact from testimony does not differ from the inferring of law from
cases.
2. Acquittal against direction of court in matter of law. May a
court, after hearing the evidence, tell a jury that upon this evidence
the law is for the plaintiff, or for the defendant? The Chief Justice
did not see how this could be done without having the court 6.rst
determine the facts. "But the Judge, qua Judge, cannot know the fact
a Note 2, supra. Also see edition by SEITZ, THE TnYAL

OF

W1LL1AM PENN & W1LL1AM

MEAD FOR CAUSING A TuMULT ("At the Sessions held at the Old Bailey in London the 1st,
3d, 4th, and 5th of September 1670. Done by themselves. Transcribed from the Compleat
Collection of State Tryals first published in 1719") (1919).
4 Vaughn 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006.
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possibly, but from the evidence which the jury have, but (as will
appear) he can never know what evidence the jury have, and consequently he cannot know the matter of fact ...."0 To support his point
that jurors might have evidence unknown to the judge, the Chief
Justice observed:
"I. Being return'd of the vicinage, whence the cause of action
ariseth, the law supposeth them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in issue (and so they must) though no evidence were given on either side in Court, but to this evidence the
Judge is a stranger.
"2. They may have evidence from their own personal knowledge, by which they may be assur'd and sometimes are, that what
is depos' d in Court, is absolutely false; but to this the Judge is a
stranger, and he knows no more of the fact than he hath learn' d
in Court, and perhaps by false depositions, and consequently
knows nothing.
"3. The jury may know the witnesses to be stigmatiz'd and
infamous, which may be unknown to the parties, and consequently
to the Court.
"4. In many cases the jury are to have view necessarily, in
many, by consent, for their better information; to this evidence
likewise the Judge is a stranger." 6

In delivering his celebrated opinion Vaughn was standing at the
end of one period in the history of trial by jury and at the beginning
of another. The long process by which jurors had been transformed
gradually from witnesses to judges of fact was nearly, if not entirely,
complete. In the early days of this transformation it was thought
proper to punish jurors for false verdict (by attaint or otherwise) for
the same reasons that we, today, think it proper to punish witnesses
for false testimony. Vaughn was fully aware of the transformation
which had taken place. He was obviously (from a present-day viewpoint) correct in saying that a person charged with inferring facts from
evidence should be immune from punishment for his conclusions, unless corrupt, the same as a person charged with inferring law from
cases. His argument "was so obviously right, and so obviously in
accordance with the views which public opinion approved, that it has
ever since been accepted as good law." 7
r, Id. at f012.
s Ibid.
7

I

HoLDSWORTH,

A

HisTORY OF ENGLISH

LAw, 6th ed., 345 (1938).
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Vaughn was also correct in his opinion that a judge cannot tell a
jury that upon the evidence given in court "the law is for the plaintiff,
or for the defendant" without first resolving "by his own judgment ...
what the fact is." He did not question the power of a court to instruct
a jury on the law, but did deny the power of a court to direct a verdict
for the reason the court could not know all the evidence on which the
jury was required to act.
The final step in the transformation of the jury was taken when
the courts began to hold that jurors should base their verdicts exclusively on evidence introduced in open court. The report of an anonymous case decided by the court of King's Bench in 1702 reads: "If a
jury give a verdict on their own knowledge, they ought to tell the Court
so, that they may be sworn as witnesses; and the fair way is to tell the
Court before they are sworn, that they have evidence to give."8 In
1764 Lorcf Mansfield declared: "A juror should be as white paper,
and know neither plaintiff-nor defendant, but judge of the issue merely
as an abstract proposition upon the evidence produced before him." 9
At the time of°Bushelrs case (1670) the practice of setting aside
verdicts as against evidence was recognized, but not fully developed.
Before a judge could say that a verdict was against evidence, it was of
course necessary that he know the evidence. Vaughn's reason for
denying power in a court to direct a verdict applied with equal force
to the granting of a new trial on the evidence. In Smith ex dem.
Dormer v. Parkhurst (King's Bench, 1738)1° it was argued against a
rule for new trial that "the evidence of one or two witnesses ought not
to overturn the finding of twelve gentlemen of figure and fortune, who
might too be governed by their own knowledge." In support of the
rule, counsel argued that this objection, if allowed, would "put an end
to the granting a new trial in any case whatsoever, because on such
a supposition no verdict can be said to be found against evidence."11
Lee, C. J., pointed out that the court had exercised the power of granting new trials "for more than eighty years." The attaint having become
no remedy ''by reason of the difficulty of the proceedings, and the
severity of the punishment," the courts have "gone into this easier
remedy of granting new trials." The Chief Justice referred to Sir
Christopher Musgrave v. Nevinson (Common Pleas, 1724)1 2 in which
s 1 Salk. 405, 91 Eng. Rep. 352.
9 Mylock v. Saladine, 1 Bl. W. 480, 96 Eng. Rep. 278.
10 And. 315, 95 Eng. Rep. 414.
11 Id. at 416.
12 2 Raym. LI. 1358, 92 Eng. Rep. 384.
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the court had held "that where the evidence was doubtful, a new trial
should not be granted after a trial at Bar; . . . but where it is against
evidence, it may." After reviewing the evidence produced in court,
the Chief Justice concluded that the verdict was not "against all evidence," and therefore denied a n,ew trial. He did not, it seems, give
any consideration to the argument that the jurors might have been
governed by their own knowledge.
The development of the practice of granting new trials, both before and after Bushell's case, shows that Vaughn was wrong in placing
so much emphasis on the inability of a judge to know the evidence on
which a jury must act. The old system was then so nearly gone that
his argument against directed verdicts was based on a structure which
was already tottering, and was soon to fall.
B. Early Directed Verdicts

Wilkinson v. Kitchin (King's Bench, 1696)1 3 was indebitatus
assumpsit for money given a solicitor to procure the plaintiff's discharge
from prison. It being proved that the defendant had confessed that
he had disposed of the money in bribes, "the jury by direction gave a
verdict for the plaintiff." College of Physicians v. Levett (King's Bench,
1699)1 4 was debt against a physician for having practiced in London
without a license from the College of Physicians. The defendant
pleaded nil debet. His defense was that he was a graduate doctor of
Oxford. It was ruled by Holt, C. J., that the defendant could not
practice in London without a license from the College of Physicians.
"And by his direction a verdict was given for the plaintiffs." Syderbottom v. Smith (King's Bench, 1725)1 5 was an action against the
indorser of a promissory note. "The Chief Justice directed the jury,
to find for the defendant, because the plaintiff had not proved diligence
to get the money from the drawer." Rich ex dem. Cullen v. Johnson
(King's Bench, 1740)1 6 was ejectment for mines in a certain manor.
The plaintiff proved himself lord of the manor and in possession thereof, but the same witness proved that the defendants had been in possession of the mines more than twenty years. The court held that the
plaintiff's proof was "no evidence" to avoid the statute of limitations,
and "therefore directed the jury to find for the defendants." Referring
13 1 Raym. Ld. 89, 91 Eng. Rep. 956.
14 1 Raym. Ld. 472, 91 Eng. Rep. 1214.
15 1 Str. 649, 93 Eng. Rep. 759.
10 2 Str. 1142, 93 Eng. Rep. 1088.
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to Erving v. Cradock (Massachusetts, 1761),17 Governor Bernard reported: "The whole Bench directed the jury, as strongly as they could,
to find for the defendant. Nevertheless they found for the plaintiff.... "
In present-day practice a directed verdict is a device for taking a
case from the jury when there is no issue of fact for the jury to decide.
The jury brings in a verdict, but it is clearly recognized that the act
of the jury is merely a matter of form. This practice must be carefully
distinguished from (I) instruction on the law and (2) advice on the
facts. In the early l 700's the judges regularly instructed juries on
the law and advised them on the facts, but did they take a case from
the jury when it developed on the trial that there was no issue of fact
for the jury to decide? In Chichester v. Philips (King's Bench, 1680)1 8
the defendant requested the trial justices to "direct the jury" that certain writings produced by her were "conclusive evidence" to prove she
was not guilty of the trespass charged against her. This request was refused, and the matter was left to the jury. On writ of error the court of
King's Bench held that "though the evidence be conclusive, yet the jury
may hazard an attaint if they please; and the proper way for the defendant had been to have demurred upon the plaintiff's evidence." 19 In the
case of Sir Christopher lvlusgrave v. Nevinson (Common Pleas,
1724)11° the evidence was "summed up to the jury by Lord Chief
Justice Pratt, with great stress laid on the evidence for the defendant."
The jury, nevertheless, "gave a verdict for the plaintiff, to the· dissatisfaction of the Court." Referring to this case in 1738,21 Lee, Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, said:
"In that case the verdict was against evidence; for the question
was, whether Sir Christopher Musgrave was a good alderman;
and it appeared that he was chosen alderman at an assembly held
without notice, and where several of the common council were
absent. Upon this the jury were directed, and certainly very
rightly, to find against the election; but they found to the contrary: for which reason a new trial was granted."
According to the reporter, the judge "summed up" the evidence with
"great stress laid" on the defendant's evidence; according to Chief
Justice Lee, the jury was "directed" to find a certain way. It should
be noted further that when the jury found contrary to the direction
17

Quincy's Mass. Rep. 556, ~ppx. II.

1s Raym. T. 404, 83 Eng. Rep. 21 I.
10 Id. at 212.
20 2 Raym. Ld.

1358, 92 Eng. Rep. 384.

21Smith ex dem. Domer v. Parkhurst, And. 315, 95 Eng. Rep. 414 at 417.
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of the court, the remedy was the granting of a new trial. The proper
practice for taking a case away from the jury was, as pointed out in
Chichester v. Philips, 22 a demurrer to the evidence. It seems reasonably
clear that the directed verdict of the early 1700's was either instruction
on the law or advice on the facts, or a mixture of the two. It was not
a device for taking a case from a jury on the ground that there was
no issue for the jury to try.

C. Demurrer to Evidence

A demurrer to evidence was analogous to a demurrer to pleading.
Upon a demurrer to a pleading the pleader might amend or join in
the demurrer. _If he joined in the demurrer, the pleadings (oral or
written) were entered on the record. The issue of law formed by
the demurrer and joinder was tried by the court. The facts alleged
in the pleading were deemed to be true. A judgment on the demurrer
ended the case on the merits. 23 There was no trial by jury. That the
demurrer to evidence was closely analogous is· shown by the report of
the case of Robert N ewis and -i.vife Scolastica v. Lark & Hunt (Common
Pleas, 1571): 24
Demurrer: "And the aforesaid William Lark and John Hunt,
in their own proper persons, say, that the evidences and allega, tions aforesaid on behalf of the aforesaid Robert Newis and
Scolastica above alleged, are insufficient in law to maintain the
assize aforesaid, to which they have no necessity, nor are, by the
law of the land, bound to answer: wherefore for want of sufficient
evidence in this behalf, they pray judgment that the jurors aforesaid from giving their verdict in the premisses may be discharged,
&c...."
Joinder: "And the aforesaid Robert and Scolastica say, that
for that they have shewn in evidence to the recognitors aforesaid
sufficient matter in maintenance of the assize aforesaid, which
said matter the aforesaid William Lark and John Hunt do not
deny, nor thereunto in anywise answer, pray judgment, and that
the same jurors thereof may be discharged, and that the aforesaid
William Lark and John Hunt·of that assize-may be convicted, &c."
It was pointed out by the judges that "a demurrer upon evidence goes
to the law upon the matter, and not to the truth of the fact, for it
22

23
24

Raym. T. 404, 83 Eng. Rep. 211.
See Blume, "Theory of Pleading," 47 Mi:cu. L. REv. 297 at 301 (1949).
2 Pl. Com. 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609 at 615.
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admits that to be true, but denies the operation of the law thereupon." 25
Upon a demurrer to evidence the evidence was entered on the court's
record. The jury was discharged, unless retained for a hearing in
damages. The issue of law formed by the demurrer and joinder was
determined by the court.
In Middleton v. Baker (King's Bench, 1600)26 it was held "by
all the Court" that if the plaintiff gives in evidence "any matter in
writing or record," and the defendant offers to demur, the plaintiff
"ought to join in the demurrer, or waive the evidence ... but if either
party offers to demur upon any evidence given by witness, the other,
unless he pleaseth, shall not be compelled to join." In Gibson v. Hunter
(House of Lords, 1793)27 it was held that a party must join in a
demurrer in any case in which the demurrant shall enter on the record
not merely the evidence, but an admission of the truth of each fact
which the evidence "conduces to prove." Under the practice settled
by this case the trial court might be called upon to determine whether
there was evidence which conduced to prove each fact necessary to
sustain the party's case. If such evidence was found to be present the
demurrant was reqwred to admit the facts. By joining in the demurrer
the proponent could take the case from the jury. Since all required
facts were admitted on the record to be true, judgment for the proponent nec~sarily followed. Where the demurrant was not required
to admit the truth of a particular fact because the evidence did not
conduce to prove that fact, the proponent's joinder in the demurrer
raised a question of law as to whether the omitted fact was necessary
to the proponent's case. If the court found that it was necessary, the
proponent lost, his evidence being "insufficient in- law" to maintain
his case.

D. Involuntary Nonsuit
"Often," according to Vaughn, C. J., in Bushell's Case (Common
Pleas, 1670),28 "upon the judges opinion of the evidence given in
court, the plaintiff becomes nonsuit." In Sadler v. Robins (King's
Bench, 1808)29 Lord Ellenborough stated: "Judges are in the habit
of directing a nonsuit" when "it is clear the action will not lie." In
211 Id. at 620.

Cro. Eliz. 752, 78 Eng. Rep. 983.
H. 187, 126 Eng. Rep. 499.
28 Vaughn 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006.
20 1 Camp. 253, 170 Eng. Rep. 948 at 949.
26

212 Bl.
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Ward v. Mason (Exchequer, 1821)30 the question was whether a nonsuit directed by the judge at nisi prius should be set aside. Graham,
B., stated:
"The Judge has certainly a right to put the party out of Court,
wherever the case is once resolved into a pure question of law. On
the other hand, it is the duty of the Judge who tries the cause, to
leave the case, if it turns on a question of fact, to the Jury. As to
the acquiescence of the Counsel, in not interposing; I do not consider that binding on them. I take the distinction to be, that where
the Counsel for the Plaintiff asks to be nonsuited, they cannot
afterwards move to set it aside; but where the Judge orders it,
without their concurrence, I think they are not precluded, although they do not object at the time." 31

In the same case Garrow, B., observed:
"I admit, that where there is no question of law in the case, a
nonsuit cannot stand, if it should be arbitrarily directed; but how
very many times have we all witnessed, that after a Plaintiff's case
has been gone through, the Judge has suggested to his Counsel,
that he had better be called. Sometimes it has happened, undoubtedly, that the Plaintiff refuses to be nonsuited, and then
the case goes to the Jury, with the disadvantage of the Judge's
decided opinion against the merits of it. ... For my own part, I
should never think of deeming it at all disrespectful to myself,
in Counsel stating that they would wish to take the sense of the
Jury on their case, rather than be nonsuited on my opinion; and
in that case, I should of course let the cause go on. "82
•
According to Tidd, it was usual to "call" the plaintiff whenever he
was "unable to make out his case, either by reason of his not adducing
evidence in support of it or evidence arising in the proper county."33
If, when called, the plaintiff did not appear, he was nonsuited; the
jurors were discharged; the action was at an end.34 When the judge
suggested that the plaintiff be called, the plaintiff had to decide whether
to heed the advice of the judge and not appear, or appear and insist
on a verdict. Since, under the early practice, he could always insist on
a verdict, it was said: ''The plaintiff in no case is compellable to be
nonsuited. "35
30 9 Price 291,
81 Id. at 97.

147 Eng. Rep. 96.

82Jd.at98.
ss2 Tmn's Practice, 3d ed., 796 (1803).
34 3 Blackst. Comm., Wendell ed., 376 (1854).
35 2 Tmn's Practice, 3d ed., 798 (1803).

564

M1cmGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 48

At the close of the plaintiff's case in Davis v. Hardy (King's Bench,
1827)36 (an action for malicious prosecution) the trial judge thought
there was sufficient proof of want of probable cause. The defendant
then proceeded with his case, calling one Stainer as a witness. After
hearing this witness, the judge was of opinion that the testimony of
the witness showed probable cause. Counsel for the plaintiff "then
insisted that it ought to be left to the jury to find whether they believed
Stainer's evidence." The judge, however, "refused to leave any question to the jury, and nonsuited the plaintiff." A rule nisi to set aside
the nonsuit was discharged, Bayley, J., saying:
"I think that in this case there was sufficient evidence of probable cause, and such evidence, too, as a jury ought to be directed
to proceed upon. If there is nothing in the demeanor of a witness,
or in the story he tells, to impeach his credit, and he is not contradicted by testimony on the other side, it is not a case for a jury
to deliberate upon. If the case had been submitted to the jury,
and they had disbelieved this witness, I think we should have been
bound to send the case down to a new trial." 37

In Toomey v. The London, etc., Ry. Co. (Common Pleas, 1857)38
"the plaintiff was nonsuited, with leave to move to enter a verdict for
£35 (agreed damages), if the court should be of opinion that there
was evidence which ought to have been submitted to the jury." A
rule for verdict was refused, Williams, J., stating:
"I think there was no evidence of negligence on the part of
the company or their servants which ought to have been submitted
to the jury. It is not enough to say there was some evidence; for,
every person who has had any experience in courts of justice
knows very well that a case of this sort against a railway company
could only be submitted to a jury with one result. A scintilla of
evidence, or a mere surmise that there might have been negligence
on the part of the defendants, clearly would not justify the judge
in leaving the case to the jury: there must be evidence upon
which they might reasonably and properly conclude that there was
negligence."39
This case and the case of Davis v. Hardy, supra, give us in brief
the modem law of involuntary nonsuits:
6 B. & C. 225, 108 Eng. Rep. 436.
Id. at 438.
38 3 C.B. N.S. 145, 140 Eng. Rep. 694.
so Id. at 696.
36
37
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(1) A case may be taken from the jury (by directing a nonsuit
without the plaintiff's assent) when the only question Jo be decided
is a question of law.
(2) Whether the plaintiff has introduced evidence on which a
jury may "reasonably and properly" find for the plaintiff is a question
of law.
(3) Whether in light of the defendant's uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence the plaintiff can recover is a question of law.
( 4) In deciding the question indicated in (2) a mere "scintilla"
of evidence or a mere "surmise" is not enough to take the case to the
Jury.
(5) In deciding the question indicated in (3) the possibility that
the jury might disbelieve the defendant's witnesses is not enough to
take the case to the jury.
(6) In deciding the question indicated in (3) the court should
consider whether it would be ''bound" to set aside a verdict for the
plaintiff.

E. Directed Verdict for Plaintiff
With the development of the involuntary nonsuit it was possible
to put the plaintiff out of court without a verdict when he failed in his
proof, and when he failed to contradict the defendant's proof, but it
was not possible, of course, to put the defendant out of court by nonsuit when he failed to contradict a prima facie case. The only procedure was to direct the jury to find for the plaintiff. In People v. Cook
(New York Court of Appeals, 1853)40 Willard, J., after pointing out
that it had been settled in New York "for half a century" that a plaintiff
might be "compelled to be nonsuited against his consent," stated:
"At the close of the cause, if a prima facie case be established
on the part of the plaintiff, and it is undisputed by the defendant,
it has been always usual to direct a verdict for the plaintiff....
This rests upon the same principle as the power to nonsuit, that
the court is the judge of the law when there is no dispute about
the facts. Verdicts to an immense amount are daily taken under
the direction of the presiding judge in cases yvhere the defence
has wholly failed. The jury assent to the direction by giving their
verdict."41
40 8

N.Y. ( 4 Selden) 67.
UJd. at 75.
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It should be noted, however, that the jury was not compelled to follow
the direction of the judge. This is shown by Willard's further statement:
"The judge did not in the present case decide the question of
fact. He withdrew nothing from the jury. His decision amounted
only to a charge to find those issues for the plaintiff. The jury
might have refused to do so, or have found the other way without
being liable to punishment. The only remedy for such a verdict
would have been to set it aside." 42
When the plaintiff failed in his proof, he could be nonsuited "against
his consent." When the defendant failed to contradict a prima facie
case, the court could "direct," but not compel, a verdict for the plaintiff.

F. Verdict Directed so Party 1\II.ight Testify
Before abrogation of the rule which prevented parties from testifying as witnesses, a person might be joined as a defendant in a tort action
to keep him from testifying for the other defendants. This trick would
be disclosed when the plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence against
the person so joined. In Van Deusen v. Van Slyck (New York Supreme
Court, 1818)43 the court said:
"In actions for torts against several, although they join in the
plea of not guilty, one may be found guilty and the other not
guilty. The rule has been long and well settled, in such actions,
that where there is no evidence against one of the defendants, he
is entitled to his discharge, and may be examined as a witness for
the other defendants. If this were not allowed, great injustice
might be done by including witnesses in the suit, for the express
purpose of shutting out their testimony."

In Wilmarth v. Mountford (United States Circuit Court, Third Circuit, 1821)44 the court found:
"There is no evidence then, not the slightest, against this
defendant, upon which the jury can possibly find him guilty.
· The jury therefore may at once find these defendants not guilty.
"The jury found .according to this direction, without leaving
their seats, and Wentz was examined as a witness for the remaining defendants." ·
42Jd.at 76.
43 15 Johnson's Rep. 223 at 224.
44 4 Washington's Rep. 79 at 80-81.
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In Dunn v. Murray (Supreme Court of Michigan, 1842)45 Whipple,
J., stated:
"The proposition is undeniable that one of several persons
charged with the commission of a trespass cannot be discharged
by the Court, nor can the Court direct a nolle prosequi to be
entered, or the jury to render a verdict of acquittal, where there is
any legal testimony, however slight, against him...."
From these statements it appears there were at least three methods by
which a witness wrongfully joined as a party could be taken out of
the case.

G. Advice on the Facts
The "directed" nonsuit of the l 700's was advice by the judge to
the plaintiff on the facts as developed in the case. The "directed"
verdict of that period was instruction on the law, advice on the facts,
or a mixture of the two. 46 An important step toward clarification of
the term "direction" was taken when the courts began to require the
judge to distinguish between advice on the facts and instruction on
the law. In New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Walden (New York Court
for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors, 1815)47
Chancellor Kent stated:
"I am far from wishing to restrain the judges of the Courts of
law from expressing freely their opinions to the jury on matters
of fact. . . . All that I feel it my duty to contend for is, that whenever the judge delivers his opinion to the jury on a matter of fact,
it shall be delivered as mere opinion, and not as direction, and that
the jury shall be left to understand, clearly, that they are to decide
the fact, upon their own view of the evidence, and that the judge
interposes his opinion only to aid them in cases of difficulty, or
to inspire them with confidence in cases of doubt."

In many cases the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the power of the trial judge to advise the jury on the facts, but
has, at the same time, required a clear separation of law from fact, and
45 BLUME, MxcmcAN llNREPoRTBD OPINIONS 122 (1945).
46 Supra, pp. 560-561. In 1771 John Adams noted: "Everything that is said by the Court

to the jury, is uniformly styled in our books as a direction." Quincy's Mass. Rep. 566, Appx. Il.
Lucilius A. Emery (many years a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine), refer.
ring to a statement of Sir Matthew Hale, wrote: ''Evidently Lord Hale meant by 'direction'
merely pointing, indicating, guiding, not commanding." 24 YALE L. J. 265 at 268 (1915).
47 12 Johnson's Rep. 513 at 519.
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has insisted that the judge tell the jurors that they were not bound by
the judge'~ opinion of the facts. 48 In some thirty-seven states the judge
is not permitted to advise on the facts. 49 With the separation of "direction" on the facts from "direction" on the law, the term "direction"
took on a new meaning. It is no longer advice, but is "imperative""mandatory"- "peremptory."

H. Binding Instructions on the Law
The first step in the development of the modem directed verdict
was taken when. the courts began to instruct juries that they were
bound to follow the law laid down by the court. Due to the popular
belief in "The Right of Juries" recognized in Bushell's Case, and due
to the fact that courts had no way to compel juries to follow peremptory
·instructions, except by threatening new trials, it was often claimed that
juries had the right as well as the power to determine the law. 50
In Macheath v. Haldimand (King's Bench, 1786)51 the question
was whether General Haldimand, Governor of Quebec, was personally
liable for supplies furnished the fort of Michilimackinac. Buller, J.,
was of opinion at the trial that since the goods were supplied to the
government, and the defendant had not personally undertaken to pay,
the plaintiff ought to be nonsuited. Plaintiff's counsel blocked a nonsuit by appearing when the plaintiff was "called." The judge then
"left the question to the jury, telling them they were bound to 6.nd for
the defendant in point of law." The jury found for the defendant. A
rule for new trial, on the ground of misdirection, was discharged, Lord
Mansfield saying:
''Then it was objected, that whether the defendant had made
himself liable or not was a question which ought to have been left
to the jury to decide. But there was no evidence which was proper
for their consideration; for the evidence consisting altogether of
written documents and letters which were not denied, the import
48 McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 170 (1828); Tracy v. Swartwout, IO Pet. (35 U.S.) 79 (1836); Games v. Dunn, 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 322 (1840); Starr
v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 14 S.Ct. 919 (1894); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S.
466, 53 S.Ct. 689 (1933); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 S.Ct. 223 (1933).
49 See "Here it is Again!-Effort to Abridge Power of Federal Judges in Jury '!'.rials,"
23 A.B.A.J. 521 (1937). Also see note on United States v. Meltzer, (C.C.A. 7th, 1938)
k°87 UNIV. PA. L. Rnv. 484 (1939).
.
• liO See Howe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 52 HARv. L. RBv. 582 (1939).
lil 1 T.R. 172, 99 Eng. Rep. 1036.
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of them was matter of law and not of fact. Therefore I am of
opinion that the verdict should stand."52
Buller's charge to the jury in Macbeath v. Haldimand should be
compared with the charge given by Chief Justice Jay in Georgia v.
Brailsford (United States Supreme Court, 1794): 53
"The facts comprehended in the case are agreed; the only
point that remains, is to settle what is the law of the land arising
from those facts; and on that point, it is proper that the opinion of
the court should be given. . . .
"It may not be amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you of the
good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the
jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court, to decide.
But it must be observed, that by the same law, which recognizes
this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have, nevertheless,
a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine
the law as well as the fact in controversy."54

In Bingham v. Cabot (United States Supreme Court, 1795)55 Iredell,
J., observed: "It will not be sufficient to remark, that the court might
charge the jury to find for the defendant; because, though the jury will
generally respect the sentiments of the court on points of law, they are
not bound to deliver a verdict conformable to them." Forty years later
in United States v. Battist (United States Circuit Court, First Circuit,
1835)5 6 Story, J., "in summing up to the jury," said:
"Before I proceed to the merits of this case, I wish to say a
few words upon a point . . . upon which I have had a decided
opinion during my whole professional life. It is, that in criminal
cases, and especially in capital cases, the jury are the judges of the
law, as well as of the fact. My opinion is, ·that the jury are no
more judges of the law in a capital or other criminal case, upon
the plea of not guilty, than they are in every civil case, tried upon
the general issue. In each of these cases, their verdict, when general, is necessarily compounded of law and of fact; and includes
both. In each they must necessarily determine the law, as well as
the fact. In each, they have the physical power to disregard the
law, as laid down to them by the Court. But I deny, that, in any
112 Id.

at 1040.

53 3 Dallas (3
114 1d. at 3-4.

115 3
56 2

U.S.) I.

Dallas (3 U.S.) 19 at 33.
Sumner 240 at 243.
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case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to decide the law
according to their own notions, or pleastJ!e."
_"
,__
.

,

,

This case, according to Professor Howe, "seems more effectively than
any other decision to have deflected the current of American judicial
opinion away from the recognition of the jury's right." 07 In Games v.
Dunn (United States Supreme Court, 1840)58 McLean, J., declared:
"When matter of law is given by the court to the jury, it should be
considered conclusive." According to Grier, J., in Roberts v. Cooper
(United States Supreme Court, 1857),59 "it is the province of the
court to instruct the jury as to the principles of law affecting the case,
and counsel cannot appeal to a jury to decide legal questions by reading
cases to them, or giving in evidence opinions of public officers."

a

I. Directed Verdicts in Federal Courts
In Company of Carpenters, etc. v. Hayward (King's Bench,
1780) 60 a nonsuit was denied, Buller, J., saying: "Whether there be
any evfdence, is a question for the Judge. Whether sufficient evidence,
is for the jury." In Greenleaf v. Birth (United States Supreme Court,
1835)61 McLean, J., stated: "Where there is no evidence tending to
prove a particular fact, the court are bound so to instruct the jury, when
requested." In Parks v. Ross (United States Supreme Court, 1850) 62
the trial judge, at the close of the plaintiff's case, instructed the jury
"that, if the evidence is believed by the jury to be true, the plaintiff is
not entitled to recover." This instruction was approved by the Supreme
Court, Grier, J., saying:
57 Howe, "Juries as Judges of Criminal Law," 52 HARv. L. Rl!v. 582 at 590 (1939).
In Sparf and Hansen v. United States, [156 U.S. 51, 51 S.Ct. 273 (1895)] Story's views
in United States v. Battist were re-affirmed by a majority of the Court. An lliinois statute
adopted in 1827, provicling that "Juries in all [criminal] cases shall be judges of the law and
fact" was held unconstitutional in 1931. [People v. Bruner, 343 ill. 146 at 148, 175 N.E.
400 (1931)]. Wheri Professor Howe wrote in 1939 only Indiana and Maryland were clinging
to the old view. [Howe, supra, this note, at 614.] Quincy (in an appendix to his volume of
Massachusetts Reports) stated at p. 567: "Even in civil cases, the right of the jury to decide
the law seems to have been recognized until since the beginning of the present century
[1800's] ...• In criminal cases, the right of the jury to decide the law was repeatedly recognized and affirmed and never denied, in Massachusetts, until 1846, since which time it has
been disallowed."
5814 Pet. (39 U.S.) 322 at 326.
59 20 How. (61 U.S.) 467 at 481.
oo 1 Doug}. 374, 99 Eng. Rep. 241.
619 Pet. (34 U.S.) 292 at 299.
0211 How. (52 U.S.) 361 at 372-373.
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"A jury has no right to assume the truth of any material fact,
without some evidence legally sufficient to establish it. It is, therefore, error in the court to instruct the jury that they may find a
material fact, of which there is no evidence from which it mav be
legally inferred.
,
"Hence the practice of granting an instruction like the present,
which makes it imperative upon the jury to find a verdict for the
defendant, and which has in many States superseded that ancient
practice of a demurrer to evidence. It answers the same purpose,
and should be tested by the same rules. A demurrer to evidence
admits not only the facts stated therein, but also every conclusion
which a jury might fairly or reasonably infer therefrom."
Upon a demurrer to the evidence at the close of the plaintiff's case
the trial judge might be called upon to answer two questions: (1) Is
there any evidence which tends to prove any material fact not expressly
admitted by the defendant's demurrer? (2) Are the facts admitted by
the demurrer sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's case?63 Both of these
questions were answered by the judge, the jury being discharged. The
second question called for an application of law to admitted facts, and
therefore was clearly a question of law. The first question required the
judge to examine the evidence to determine whether a particular fact
should be admitted or deemed admitted. This question did not involve
the application of a principle or rule of law, but was classified as a
question of law because it was answered by the judge, and not by the
jury. "Whether there be any evidence, is a question for the judge."64
When, in 1850, the Supreme Court held that a judge, in a proper
case, might give a jury an "imperative" instruction to find for the
defendant, even though they believed the plaintiff's evidence, the Court
was merely recognizing the power of the judge to decide tvvo questions
of "law" which might be decided by a judge upon a demurrer to the
evidence under the old practice. The plaintiff's evidence might all
be true, and the facts which it tended to prove might all be true, yet
the plaintiff might have no right to recover because the facts proved
and deemed admitted were insufficient in law to sustain his case. If
there was no evidence tending to prove a certain fact, it was considered
error to instruct the jurors they might find that fact. 65 And the judge
63 See Demurrer
64 Supra, at note
65 Supra, at note

to Evidence, supra, p. 561.
60.
62.
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could be required to instruct the jury there was no such evidence. 66
When called upon to instruct there was no evidence tending to prove
a certain fact, the judge, of necessity, had to' review the evidence introduced. In determining whether there was evidence tending to prove
the particular fact, the judge was performing the same function as was
performed by the judge on demurrer to the evidence. If it was proper
for the judge to instruct the jurors there was no evidence tending to
prove a certain fact, and improper for him to instruct them they could
find such fact in the absence of evidence, there was no reason why the
judge could not tell the jurors simply to find for the defendant. In
giving such an instruction the judge first determined as a matter of law
that certain facts must be proved to sustain the plaintiff's case, and
then determined there was no evidence tending to prove one or more
of the necessary facts. In making both of these determinations the
judge was exercising powers long exercised by judges under the old
common law.
In Richardson v. The City of Boston (United States Supreme
Court, 1856)67 Grier, J., stated:
"If there be 'no evidence whatever,' as in the case of Parks
v. Ross, (11 How., 393) to prove the averments of the declara.,tion, it is the duty of the court to give such peremptory instruction.
But if there be some evidence tending to support the averment,
its value must be submitted to the jury with proper instructions
from the court."
This opinion was expressed one year before the English Court of King's
Bench held that "some" evidence-a mere "scintilla" or "surmise"-was
not enough to prevent a nonsuit. 68 In Improvement Company v.
Munson (United States Supreme Court, 1871)69 we find this statement by Clifford, J.:
"Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave
it to the jury, but recent decisions of high authority have established a more reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the
judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether
there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a
66 Supra,

at note 61.

67 19 How. (60 U.S.)
68 Supra, at note 38.
69

263 at 268-269.

14 Wall. (81 U.S.) 442 at 448.
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verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof
is imposed."
In Pleasant v. Fant (United States Supreme Court, 1874)70 Miller,
J., asked: "Must the court go through the idle ceremony in such a case
of submitting to the jury the testimony on which plaintiff relies, when
it is clear to the judicial mind that if the jury should find a verdict in
favor of plaintiff that verdict would be set aside and a new trial had?"
The court of King's Bench had directed a nonsuit in 1827 because
the judges were of opinion they would be "bound" to set aside a
verdict for the plaintiff on motion for new trial. 71
When the Supreme Court approved the practice of directing a
verdict where there was "literally no evidence" on which the jury
might find a necessary fact, the Court in no way impaired the right of
jury trial guaranteed by the federal Constitution. For centuries such
cases had been taken from juries on demurrers to evidence. When the
Court declared that such a direction was "imperative" on the jury, the
Court took the position that right to jury trial did not include a right
on the part of the jury to determine the law. This was contrary to the
Court's earlier views, but was in accord with what was then considered
the true common law. When the Court adopted from the English
nonsuit cases the "reasonable inference" rule, it was treading on new
ground. The same was true when the Court approved the "new trial"
test suggested by the court of King's Bench in 1827.72 Do these new
tests to any extent impair the constitutional right to jury trial?
In Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. (United States Supreme Court, 1913)73 Van Devanter, J., summed up the prior decisions
of the Supreme Court as holding:
"... (a) that we must look to the common law for a definition of
the nature and extent of the right of trial by jury which the Constitution declares 'shall be preserved;' (b) that the right so preserved is the right to have the issues of fact presented by the
pleadings tried by a jury of twelve, under the direction and superintendence of the court; (c) that the rendition of a verdict is of
the substance of the right, because to dispense with a verdict is
to eliminate the jury which is no less a part of the tribunal charged
with the trial than is the court...."
10 22 Wall. (89 U.S.)
71 Supra, at note 36.

116 at 122.

72Jbid.
73

228 U.S. 364 at 397, 33 S.Ct. 523.
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According to this statement the constitutional right to jury trial is a
right to have the issues of fact presented by the pleadings tried by a jury
of twelve. It should be noted, however, that issues of fact are formed
in two ways: (1) by pleadings, (2) by evidence. When an issue of
fact is formed by pleadings in a type of case triable by jury, there is a
right to jury trial. This right, however, is only provisional. A jury is
impaneled, and evidence introduced. If the evidence fails to form an
issue of fact, the right to jury trial disappears.

In the Slocum case, supra, Justice Van Devanter reviewed at some
length the practice of taking cases from juries on demurrers to evidence-a practice which was older than the Seventh Amendment.
When a demurrer was made, the case was not taken from the jury
unless the opposite party joined in the demurrer. But a joinder could
be compelled when the demurrant made the required admissions of
fact. Justice Van Devanter failed to observe that the effect of the
demurrant's admissions was to eliminate any issues of fact made by the
evidence, leaving on the record the issues of fact formed by the pleadings. Unless it can be said that the admissions by the demm:rant had
the effect of amending his pleadings, a judgment might be based on
facts admitted by the demurrer, which at the same time were denied by
the pleadings. The admissions made unnecessary any trial of the issues
formed by the pleadings. The jury was discharged.
To say there is a constitutional right to a jury's verdict whenever
there is an issue of fact presented by the pleadings, regardless of
whether an issue of fact is formed by the evidence, is to place form
above substance. The right guaranteed by the Constitution is the right
to jury trial; not a right to a jury's verdict. There is no right to a trial
unless there is an issue to be tried.
In applying what may be called the "issue" test to determine
whether there is a right to jury trial, each factual element in the claim
or defense should be considered separately. There may be issues formed
by the evidence as to some of the facts and not as to others. Only those
facts which are in issue under the evidence should go to the jury for
determination. The right of jury trial extends to these facts, and to
these alone.
It is not possible to say what facts, if any, are actually in issue until
all of the evidence has been introduced. It may be possible, however, to
say at an earlier stage that a certain fact in issue under the pleadings
will not be in issue under the evidence. This exceptional situation is
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presented when the plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence·fo prove
one of the factual elements of his claim. Since it cannot be assumed
that the defendant will supply this missing evidence, it can be seen
at once there ·will be no issue involving the particular fact for the jury
to decide. If the jury cannot find this fact for the plaintiff, there is no
point in having the jury decide issues which may be formed as to the
other facts. A similar situation is presented when the plaintiff's evidence tending to prove one of his necessary facts is so weak that it
must be disregarded under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex.
When all of the evidence has been introduced it is the function of
the judge to determine what facts in issue under the pleadings are also
in issue under the evidence introduced. The following chart for checking the existence of issues of fact may be of us~:
Ultimate facts to be proved by
having the burden of proo
Fact I

Fact 2

Fact 3

rrty

Fact 4

&c

I. No evidence to prove:
2. Substantial evidence to
prove:
3. Conclusive evidence to
prove:
4. No evidence to contradict:

5. Substantial evidence to
contradict:

6. Conclusive evidence to
contradict:

--

1. No evidence to prove. If, at the close of all the evidence, a check
mark (\I) is correctly placed in any column of line 1 indicating there
is no evidence by either party tending to prove the fact listed at the
head of the column, the provisional right to have a jury try the issues
formed by the pleadings, disappears. This was true under the old
demurrer to the evidence, and became true in the federal courts when
the Supreme Court recognized in 1835 that it is proper to instruct a
jury that"... there is no evidence tending to prove a particular fact."H
Since this instruction is "imperative" on the jury, the only verdict
which can be rendered is one against the party having the burden of
proving the particular fact. The jury has no choice. Delivery of a
74

Supra, at note 61.
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verdict is merely a matter of form. Whether the court tells the jurors
they cannot find a necessary fact for the party having the burden of
proof, or simply tells them to bring in a verdict for the other party, the
result is just the same. The provisional right to jury trial has disappeared.
2. Substantial evidence to prove. The term "substantial" is used to
distinguish evidence which is so slight that it must be disregarded
under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, from evidence which
is worthy of consideration by a court. The term "some evidence" is
ambiguous in this respect, and, therefore, should not be used. If, at
the close of all the evidence, there is evidence worthy of consideration
introduced by either party which tends to prove all the facts which
must be proved by the party having the burden of proof, that party
has made a prima facie case (or defense). A check mark in each
column of line 2 shows a prima fade case. Whether there is a jury
issue as to any of the facts depends on whether the opposite party has
introduced contradicting evidence, or has been able to raise an issue
as to the credibility of the witnesses used to establish the prima facie
case. If there is evidence worthy of consideration tending to prove all
the ultimate facts which must be proved by the party having the burden
of proof, and there is no contradicting evidence (shown by check marks
in all the columns of line 4), and no impeachment of the witnesses
used to establish the facts, there is no issue for a jury to try. A verdict
should be directed for the party having the burden of proof.

If check marks appear in all columns of line 2 and in all columns
of line 5, there are as many jury issues as there are ultimate facts. The
whole case must go to the jury. If some of the columns of line 5 are
checked, but not all, the facts checked should be submitted to the jury;
the others should be disposed of by a partially directed verdict.
When there is weak evidence tending to prove a necessary fact it
may be very difficult to determine whether the evidence should be
disregarded under tjie doctrine of de minimis, or should be considered
as substantial. If there is no contradicting or impeaching evidence,
there is no question for a jury to decide. The judge must decide
whether the evidence is de minimis or substantial, and direct the jury
accordingly. He cannot, because of doubt, leave it to the jury to decide
whether the evidence is worthy of consideration by a court. This
question, like the question of whether there is "any" evidence, is a
question for the judge.
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When the evidence is weak, and there is contradicting or impeaching evidence, may the judge look to the opposing.evidence to determine
whether the weak evidence should be disregarded as insubstantial?
Under the "new trial" test the answer should be "yes." Upon a motion
for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence, the court of necessity must look at the evidence on both
sides. The weak evidence, when viewed alone, may appear substantial, but when viewed in the light of other evidence, may practically
disappear. A candle lighted in a dark hall may be clearly visible and
give a welcome glow until powerful arc lamps flood the hall with light.
The feeble light, which was once visible and useful, has, for practical
purposes, disappeared.
At the close of all the evidence in Southern Ry. Co. v. Walters
(Supreme Court, 1931) 75 the defendant (railway) moved for a directed verdict. The trial judge withdrew from the jury all allegations of
negligence except an allegation that the defendant's train, which had
injured the plaintiff at a crossing, had not been stopped, and the crossing flagged. The jury found for the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,70 but was
reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. Speaking for
the Circuit Court of Appeals, Gardner, J., stated:
"The question presented to the court on appeal is whether
or not there was substantial evidence to sustain the verdict. . . .
we need refer, of course, only to the testimony produced by the
plaintiff, or that tended to sustain the verdict." 77
After reviewing the evidence, Gardner, J., concluded: "We are of the
view that there was substantial evidence to sustain the verdict." 78
Roberts, J., after reviewing the evidence in the Supreme Court, concluded: "An examination of the record requires the conclusion that
the evidence on the issue whether the train was stopped before crossing
Bond Avenue was so insubstantial and insufficient that it did not justify
a submission of that issue to the jury."79 Mr. Justice Roberts did not
limit his examination of the evidence to that which was favorable to
111 284
10

U.S. 190, 52 S.Ct. 58.
(C.C.A. 8th, 1931) 47 F. (2d) 3.

77Jd. at 5.
78Jd.at7.
79 284 U.S. 190 at 194.
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the plaintiff, but first pointed out why the testimony of certain witnesses who had testified positively that the train was not stopped could
not be believed; and then called attention to the fact that "Five witnesses for defendant testified that a full stop was made and the crossing
Hagged."
In Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain (Supreme Court, 1933)80
the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, Swan, J., dissenting.81 The Supreme
Court sustained the trial judge. The question was whether there \'Vas
substantial evidence showing that decedent's death was caused by a
violent collision of freight cars. One witness had testified that he had
heard a "loud crash" and later saw the cars together. Three employees
riding on one string of the cars had testified positively that no collision
had occurred. Judge Learned Hand, for the Court of Appeals, stated:
"There are of course cases where the story of one side is impossible because of the physical situation, or because it is incredible by common experience. Southern Ry. Co. v. Walters, 284
U.S. 190, 52 S.Ct. 58, 76 L.Ed. 239, was such a case. Moreover,
in such cases the contradicting circumstances may depend upon
the testimony of other witnesses, and be conclusive only if this
be assumed to be true. . . . It is impossible to set any general rule,
for the combinations are infinite. The most that has been saidprobably all that can be-is that there comes a point where the evidence no longer justifies any verdict but one."82
While of opinion that the particular case should have gone to the jury~
Judge Hand clearly recognized that in some cases contradicting or impeaching evidence may be "conclusive." Even though each party may
introduce evidence which alone appears to be substantial, there may
come "a point where the evidence no longer justifies any verdict but
one." Justice Sutherland, for the Supreme Court, stated:
"It repeatedly has been held by this court that before evidence
may be left to the jury, 'there is a preliminary question for the
judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether
there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a
verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof
is imposed.' ... And where the evidence is 'so overwhelmingly on
so 288 U.S. 333, 53 S.Ct. 391.

s1 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 986.
s2 Id. at 987.
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one side as to leave no room to doubt what the fact is, the court
should give a peremptory instruction to the jury.' ... The rule is
settled for the federal courts, and for many of the state courts, that
whenever .in the trial of a civil case the evidence is clearly such
that if a verdict were rendered for one of the parties the other
would be entitled to a new trial, it is the duty of the judge to direct the jury to find according to the views of the court. Such a
practice, this court has said, not only saves time and expense, but
'gives scientific certainty to the law in its application to the facts
and promotes the ends of justice.' ... The scintilla rule has been
definitely and repeatedly rejected so far as the federal courts are
concemed." 83

In this case, both in the Circuit Court of Appeals and in the Supreme
Court, the evidence for the plaintiff was examined in the light of the
evidence for the defendant. If there had been no contradicting evidence and nothing to impeach the plaintiff's one witness, the evidence
tending to show a collision might have been held substantial. But the
contradictory evidence was overwhelming, and there were circumstances which made the testimony of the plaintiff's witness somewhat
suspicious. Evidence which considered alone may be thought substantial, may become insubstantial when the full light of all the evidence
is thrown upon the scene. There must be substantial evidence on both
sides before there is an issue for a jury to try.
In Wilkerson v. lv1.cCarthy (Supreme Court, 1949)84 the trial
judge (in a Utah state court) directed a verdict of "no cause of action.''
Judgment for the defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Utah, one justice dissenting,8° but was reversed by the Supreme Court
of the United States, two justices dissenting. That the plaintiff was
injured by falling into a pit in defendant's railroad yard, was undisputed. To show negligence on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff
undertook to prove that employees of the defendant not working in
the pit continued to use a board to cross the pit after safety chains
had been put up blocking such use. The plaintiff testified that he had
seen men cross the board "maybe a hundred times," but did not indicate how many of these crossings occurred after the safety chains
were put up, and did not indicate how many were by men employed
288 U.S. 333 at 343.
(U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 413. See comment, 47 MicH. L. Rsv. 974 at 980 (1949).
So (Utah 1947) 187 P. (2d) 188 at 194.
83
84
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in the pit as distinguished from other employees. One witness for the
plaintiff named two employees, in addition to himself, not working
in the pit, who had crossed on the board after the chains were put up.
His testimony as to other crossings was not limited as to time. Three
witnesses for the defendant testified that they had worked for extended
periods in or near the pit, and had never seen employees, other than
those working in the pit, cross on the board after the chains were
put up.
The plaintiff's theory in Wilkerson 11. McCarthy was that the defendant had failed to furnish the plaintiff a reasonably safe place in
which to work. For submission to a jury, a claim of this type must be
broken down into the following factual elements: (I) A certain place
was furnished, (2) the place was in a certain physical condition,
(3) The place in its then condition was not reasonably safe. A jury
question may be presented with respect to each of these elements. In
the principal case the plaintiff was required to prove that the walkway over the pit, which had been blocked by safety chains, had been
furnished to him for use in his employment as a switchman. Since
the plaintiff had not been expressly directed or invited to use the walkway, it was necessary to show that he and others .not employed in the
pit had used it long enough and openly enough, after the safety chains
were installed, to justify a conclusion that the defendant acquiesced
in such use, and in that sense furnished it to plaintiff as a place in
which to work. As stated by Justice Latimer of the Utah Supreme
Court, "If the trial court could say, as a matter of law, that plaintiff
had failed to establish, by any substantial evidence, either the time
or notoriety element, then the directed verdict was proper."
Delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
Wilkerson 11. McCarthy, Justice Black stated:
"It is the established rule that in passing upon whether there
is sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need look
only to the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to
support the case of a litigant against whom a peremptory instruc. h as been given.
.
non
. . ."86 ,
This statement must be challenged as incorrect. Under the old demurrer to the evidence the demurrant was required to adniit on the
record all facts which the evidence tended to prove. All the court had
86 (U.S.

1949) 69 S.Ct. 413 at 415.
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to do was to examine the evidence to see if there was any tending to
prove the necessary facts. The same was true under the old scintilla
rule. If the court found any evidence, however slight, tending to
prove the necessary facts, a nonsuit or directed verdict was denied.
Under both of these old rules the court looked only to the evidence
which favored the party against whom the demurrer or motion was
made. Where a motion for a directed verdict is made at the close of
the plaintiff's case, the court, of necessity, looks only to the plaintiff's
case. But where the motion is made at the close of the whole case,
the court cannot, with any degree of realism, look only at part of the
evidence without considering the whole. A layman would think it
strange to see a judge wearing blinder~ to keep himself from seeing
more than a part of the truth reflected by the evidence in a case. One
may wonder if it is possible for a mind which has seen the whole truth
to accurately shut out a part.
In a concurring opinion in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, Justice
Frankfurter observed:
"It is an important element of trial by jury which puts upon
the judge the exacting duo/ of determining whether there is solid
evidence on which a jury s verdict could be fairly based."87
Under the old demurrer to the evidence and under the old scintilla
rule it was the function of the judge to determine whether there was
"any" evidence tending to prove the necessary facts. Under the modern
law of directed verdicts it is the function of the judge to determine
whether there is "solid" or "substantial" evidence tending to prove
those facts. When there is "solid" or "substantial" evidence on both
sides there is an issue for a jury to try. But it must always be remembered that evidence which appears "solid" and "substantial" when
viewed alone may turn out to be hollow and insubstantial when viewed
in the light of all the evidence in the case.
3. Conclusive evidence to prove. In the preceding section of this
discussion an attempt was made to demonstrate that evidence which
alone appears substantial, and therefore sufficient to make a prima
facie case or defense for the party having the burden of proof, may
be completely overwhelmed by contradicting or impeaching evidence.
In this situation the contradicting or impeaching evidence is deemed
"conclusive." Even where there is a check mark in each column of
s1 Id. at 419.
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line 2 of the chart on p. 575, a check mark in any column of line 6
will show that a verdict should be directed against the party having
the burden of proof. And the same is true when there is contradicting or impeaching evidence which alone appears to be substantial,
but is completely overwhelmed by the evidence of the party having
the burden of proof. A check mark in any column of line 3 means that
a verdict should be directed on that fact for the party having the burden of proof even though there is a check mark in the same column
on line 5. Conclusive evidence to prove and to contradict the same
fact is, of course, impossible.

J.

Refusal to Return Directed Verdict

In Cahill v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, 1896)88 the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant
on the ground that the place where the plaintiff was injured was not
a "crossing." The jurors refused to return a verdict for the defendant.
The judge then said: "Very well. You may retire to your room, and
return with such verdict as you may 6.nd."89 At a later hour the judge
recalled the jurors, and again directed them to return a verdict for
the defendant. But one juror still held out. The plaintiff's attorney
was then permitted to stipulate that a judgment of dismissal might be
entered, to have the same effect as a verdict for the defendant under
the direction of the court. Woods, Circuit Judge, criticized this procedure, saying:
"The stipulation should not have been accepted. The authority and duty of a judge to direct a verdict for one party or the
other, when, in his opinion, the state of the evidence requires it,
is beyond dispute; and it is not for jurors to disobey.... The conduct of the juror in this instance was in the highest degree
reprehensible, and might well have subjected him, and any who
encouraged him to persist in his course, to punishment for contempt.... We deem it proper to observe here that it is not essential
that there be a written verdict signed by jurors or by a foreman,
and we have no doubt that, in cases where the court thinks it
right to do so, it may announce its conclusion in the presence of
the jury and of the parties or their representatives, and direct the
entry of a verdict without asking the formal assent of the jury."90
88 (C.C.A. 7th,
80 Id. at 289.

oo Id. at 290.

1896) 74 F. 285.
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While agreeing with the suggestion that it may be fatal to an appeal
for an attorney to consent to a dismissal of his case, can we agree:
(1) That jurors may be fined for not returning a verdict as directed?
(2) That a verdict may be entered without even the formal assent of
the jury impaneled to try the case?
A judgment, according to solid common-law authority, is a conclusion drawn from the formal record in the case.91 When issues of fact
have been formed by pleadings in a case triable by jury, there must
be a verdict (or findings, if a jury is waived) entered on the record
to show how the facts have been decided. Without this showing, no
judgment can be entered. When a verdict is directed, must a verdict
be entered on the record, or is it enough merely to enter the judge's
order? Without a statute, the order is not enough. This means there
must be a verdict in all jury cases in which issues of fact have been
formed by the pleadings regardless of whether there are issues for a
jury to try. When a verdict is directed, the verdict merely reflects
a decision of the judge. Why not let the judge make his own record?
Why call on laymen to make a record for a court? It being obvious
that a directed verdict does not contain any decision by the jury, it
seems strange, almost absurd, to require the jurors to assent to a
decision made by someone else. And it is especially bad to require
them to give even formal assent to a decision which they, acting according to their own views, would not have made. 92 In the Cahill
case the appellate court held that the trial judge erred in directing
the jury that the place of the accident was not a crossing. The jurors
apparently thought the place was a crossing, but were expected to
assent to a decision the other way. Since all that is needed is some
record of the judge's decision in order to have a basis for a judgment,
there is no excuse for putting any pressure, even the slightest, on jurors
to coerce them to bring in a verdict which they think is wrong. If
there must be a verdict to satisfy the need for a record, the verdict
should be one signed by the clerk pursuant to a direction by the judge.
The jurors should be thanked and excused whenever it develops that
there is no issue for the jury to try.
In the matter of Estate of Sharon ( California Supreme Court,
1918 ) 03 nine of the jurors refused to agree to a verdict directed by
91 Blume, "Theory of Pleading," 47 MxcH. L. RBv. 297 (1949).
02 A recent newspaper item (Wichita Falls, Texas) headed "Obedient Jury" reads:
"When a federal judge instructed a jury to return a verdict of innocent in a car theft case, the
foreman dutifully announced: 'We find the boy that stole that car not guilty, your honor.'"
98179 Cal. 447, 177 P. 283.

584

MrcmGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 48

the court. The judge then designated one of the remaining three
jurors to act as foreman. This juror signed the verdict. A demand
that the jury be polled was denied. This procedure was approved by
the Supreme Court, Shaw, J., stating:
"In giving a verdict upon such order the jurors do not exercise discretion, but act ministerially as the instrument by which
the court prepares the record which wi_ll support the only judgment that can lawfully be given. They are no more at liberty to
refuse obedience than is the clerk when he is directed to do the
ministerial act of entering an order or judgment of the court.
The verdict so signed by one of the jurors who is appointed as
foreman by the court and who signs in obedience to the or~er,
though in form the act of the jury, is really and in law the act of
the court.... In such a case the polling of the jury is mere useless ceremony and the law does not require it." 94
·
Relying on this opinion, a district court of appeals, in Vitimin NI.illing Corporation v. Superior Court (1933),05 held that a court may
base a judgment on an order for a directed verdict without requiring
that the verdict directed be actually returned. This holding was disapproved by the Supreme Court,96 Shenk, J., stating:
"That the court has the power to direct the jury to return a
verdict in a proper case cannot be questioned. Nor is it disputed
that the return of a verdict in such a case is a ministerial act. A
verdict in any case must be in writing. (Sec. 618, Code Civ.
Proc.) When the verdict is rendered an entry thereof must be
made in the minutes of the court. (Sec. 628, Code Civ. Proc.)
As to these requirements there is no distinction between a verdict
returned by the jury after deliberation and one returned by direction of the court. In each case the verdict serves as a basis for
the entry of a judgment thereon. In the absence of a verdict
entered as required by law there is no finality to the proceedings .
. . . And we know of no authority in law for the entry of a judgment which would, in the absence of a verdict, in any way
constitute a judgment on a verdict." 97

If we accept the view that a verdict must be entered on the record in
order to have a basis for a judgment, and agree that a jury should
Id. at 460-461.
(Cal. App. 1933) 25 P. (2d) 469; (Cal. App. 1933) 26 P. (2d) 497.
1 Cal. (2d) 116, 33 P. (2d) 1016 (1934).
97Jd at 119-120.
94

95
96
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never be coerced into signing a verdict merely to make a record, the
best solution of the record problem, in the absence of a statute, is
to have the clerk sign the verdict for the jury after the jury has been
discharged. The true solution is, of course, a statute authorizing the
entry of a judgment based on the order of the court.
In Nyswander v. Gonser (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1934)08 only
eleven jurors were present when a verdict was directed. It was held
wholly immaterial whether there were eleven or twelve jurors present, the signing of the verdict being a "mere formality." In an earlier
case, Marion v. Home Mutual Insurance Association (1928),99 the
same court speaking through Evans, J., had said:
"The signing of a verdict under direction of the court is a
mere formality, and may be followed or omitted with equal
legality. A motion to direct a verdict is the equivalent of a motion
to withdraw a case from the consideration of the jury and to
dismiss the same. To submit a directed verdict to the jury is a
formality which has no other function than to give form to the
record." 100

If, as stated earlier in this discussion, the modern directed verdict is
a device for taking a case from the jury where there is no issue of fact
for the jury to decide, the case should be taken entirely from the jury,
thereby eliminating any possibility of embarrassment to the jurors in
being required to assent to a decision made by someone else, and possibility of embarrassment to the judge resulting from a refusal by the
jurors to bring in a verdict directed by the judge.

K. Judgment n.o.v.

In fairness to trial judges it must be recognized that they are often
faced with exceedingly difficult problems in performing their "exacting duty" of determining whether there is "solid evidence" on which
a verdict may be "fairly based."101 A decision whether there is an issue
for a jury must be made by reviewing facts, yet is treated as a decision
of law. The decision is €ither right or wrong, depending on the views
of the appellate court. The trial judge has no discretion. He must
218 Iowa 136, 253 N.W. 829.
oo 205 Iowa 1300, 217 N.W. 803.
100 Id. at 1303.
08

101

Supra, at note 84.
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be right, or be reversed. Furthermore, he must act hastily while the
jury is being held; ordinarily, without time to study transcripts of
the evidence introduced. If he directs a verdict when he should not,
the whole case must be retried. If he fails to direct a verdict when he
should, the whole case must be retried. In the latter situation a retrial
is required so a new jury can be impaneled to make the record which
should have been made by the first jury. But this new jury cannot
be directed to make the record until the whole case has been retried.
It should be noted, however, that there is one situation in which
a retrial of a case in which a verdict should have been directed, is
of some value other than merely to make a record. If the party against
whom the verdict should have been directed failed to introduce evidence which he could and would have introduced but for the judge's
opinion that the evidence was unnecessary, he should, now that the
evidence has been found to be necessary, have a chance to complete
his claim or defense. While it cannot be said that such a party has
a right to rely on the opinion of the judge, the latter's decision being
classified as a decision of law, yet it seems fair to allow the party a
second chance to introduce the missing evidence. On the other hand,
if there is nothing to indicate that the party could and would have
introduced more evidence but for the judge's opinion, a retrial merely
to make a record, or to give the party a chance to put in evidence
which he should have introduced at the first trial, seems wholly unjustified.
To take care of cases in which judges have failed to direct verdicts
when required to do so, statutes have been passed authorizing a
motion for judgment non obstante veredicto after the verdict has been
returned. On this motion the trial judge must consider whether there
was an issue of fact for the jury to try. If he finds there was no jury issue,
and that the jury has found for the party against whom the verdict
should have been directed, he may enter a judgment contrary to the
verdict. Or, if he thinks a judgment n.o.v. against the successful party
would be unfair, he may grant a new trial. If the trial judge overrules the motion, being still of the opinion there was a question for
the jury, the appellate court, under the statute, may order the entry
of a judgment. A judgment n.o.v. is not only not supported by the
·verdict which appears on the record, but is directly contrary to that
part of the judgment record. The judgment is based on the order of
the court.
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In Slocum 11. New York Life Insurance Co. (United States
Supreme Court, 1913)1°2 a federal circuit court sitting in Pennsylvania
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals proceeded under a Pennsylvania
statute of the type referred to above. The trial judge denied a motion
for a directed verdict, and later denied a motion for judgment n.o.v.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed with a direction to sustain the
latter motion on the ground that the evidence did not admit of a
finding that the policy was in force at the time of the insured's death.
The Supreme Court agreed that a verdict should have been directed
for the defendant on the ground indicated, but held, four justices
dissenting, that the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals for a judgment n.o.v. was an infraction of the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In reaching this result the Court proceeded on two false conclusions: (I) That the "right to a trial by jury
is to be determined by an inspection of the pleadings and not by an
examination of the evidence." (2) That consideration of a motion
for judgment n.o.v. is a re-examination of facts tried by a jury otherwise than "according to the rules of the common law." That the first
conclusion is incorrect has been indicated earlier in this discussion. 103
The second conclusion is incorrect for the simple reason that the court
in considering the motion is not reviewing the facts found by the jury,
but is reviewing the action of the judge in passing on the motion for
directed verdict. If on this review it is found that the judge made an
error, the error is corrected by entering the judgment which should
have been entered at that time. Once the position is taken that there
is a right to jury trial if an issue of fact is made by the pleadings
regardless of the state of the evidence, there is no escape from other
false conclusions: If the pleadings form an issue, there must be a jury
of twelve; the jury must bring in a verdict; the judgment must be
in accord with the verdict. If the pleadings form an issue, a binding
direction cannot be given. The whole basis of the directed verdict
is the absence of an issue for a jury to try. Unless the evidence forms
an issue there is no right to jury trial.
In Baltimore & Carolina Line 11. Redman (United States Supreme
Court, 1935)1°4 a federal district court sitting in New York reserved
decision on two motions: (I) a motion to dismiss the complaint for
102 Supra, at note 73.
103 Supra, at pp. 573-574.
104 295 U.S. 654, 55 S.Ct.

890.
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want of sufficient evidence, (2) a motion for a directed verdict on
the same ground. The case was submitted to a jury subject to the
court's opinion on the questions reserved. The jury found for the
plaintiff. Thereafter the judge refused to grant the reserved motions,
and accordingly entered a judgment for the plaintiff. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground the evidence was
insufficient. Instead of directing the entry of a judgment as authorized by a New York statute, the judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered a new trial, thinking they were limited in this respect by the
Slocum case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Circuit
Court of Appeals should have directed a dismissal on the merits, instead
of a new trial. By finding historically that the practice of reserving
decisions was an old common-law practice, the court was able to approve a practice which was in effect the same as that provided by the
Pennsylvania statute condemned in the Slocum case. Although a
reservation is supposed to be made with the consent of the jury it is
obvious that this supposed consent is a mere fiction.
Section (b) of Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1938) provides:
"Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close
of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the
court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject
to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.
Within IO days after the reception of a verdict, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and
any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment
entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or
if a verdict was not returned such party, within 10 days after the
jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance
with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed
for in the alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may
allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and
either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the
requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned
the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial."
Under this rule, as under state statutes providing for judgments n.o.v.,
a judgment may be based on an order of the judge sustaining a reserved motion for a directed verdict, notwithstanding the verdict, if
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any, returned by the jury impaneled to try the case. Under the federal
rule the question raised by such a motion is reserved without any
pretenses of securing the consent of the jury, ·and is "deemed" reserved
even though the judge had no thought other than to deny the motion.
Under the practice thus provided an error of the judge in denying a
motion for a directed verdict can be corrected by the trial court or
by an appellate court without a retrial before another jury. The old
requirement that there must be a verdict to support any judgment
rendered in a jury case has been discarded for cases in which a verdict
may properly be directed. In those cases there is no issue for a jury to
try, and therefore no constitutional right to jury trial.

L. From Reality to Fiction to Reality
The earliest directed verdict was instruction on the law, advice on
the facts, or a mixture of the two. After it became settled that instruction on the law should be separated from advice on the facts, it was
considered proper to instruct jurors as a matter of law that certain
facts must be proved by the party having the burden of proof, and
that there was no evidence tending to prove a particular fact. This
type of instruction clearly "directed" the jury toward a verdict against
the party having the burden of proof, but was not considered as anything other than instruction on the law. A verdict returned in accordance with such a "direction" was a real verdict reached after real
deliberation by the jury. After it became settled that jurors were bound
to follow the court's instruction on the law, verdicts returned in accordance with the court's "direction" as a matter of law, ceased to be reached
after real deliberation. The directed verdict as now employed is a
mere fiction-a useless fiction which sometimes causes embarrassment
to the jurors and to the court.
From reality to fiction to reality is a familiar pattern in the history
of common-law procedure. A procedural device developed for one
puq,ose is adapted to another by means of a fiction. After the need
served by the fiction is thoroughly recognized, a new device better
adapted to serve the need is finally created. In the case of the directed
verdict, the final step in its historical development is long overdue.
A century ago it was recognized that instruction on the law was
"imperative" on the jury. It should have been recognized immediately
that any verdict returned in response to this type of instruction was
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mere form. But it has taken a century for courts to realize the true
nature of the new procedural device. Now that the fictional nature
of the directed verdict is fully recognized, we can safely discard it by
providing that no verdict of any ki~d is necessary when the judge
determines there is no issue for a jury to try.

